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RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MINORITIES IN A
CONTEXT OF POST-COLONIAL
SELF-DETERMINATION: BASQUES AND
CATALANS IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN
Jorge Martinez Paoletti*
INTRODUCTION
After four decades of an authoritative dictatorship, the Spanish pro-
cess of territorial decentralization, characterized by the total accumulation
of power in Madrid, is unanimously considered by academia as a successful
example of ethnic accommodation within a pluri-national State.' Defined by
its high degree of regional self-government and its open configuration, 2 the
Spanish "State of Autonomies" deserves to be recognized as "innovative
and generally responsive" to minority demands.3 Furthermore, it should be
* Jorge Martinez Paoletti graduated with degrees in Law and Political Science
from Universidad Carlos III (Madrid), and received his LL.M. from American Uni-
versity Washington College of Law. His main areas of practice are international
arbitration and international human rights litigation. He is currently an attorney
working with the Executive Director at the Center for Justice and International Law
(Washington, DC). The author would like to thank Professor Thomas Franck for
his wise guidance in the process of elaborating the bulk ideas of this article. He
would also like to thank Olivia Wilson, for her insights and unconditional support
throughout the summer months in which we trimmed the paper.
I See, inter alia, JERUSALEM INST. FOR FED. STUDIES, FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD: A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL, CONFEDERAL AND AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS
viii (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991).
2 The territorial organization of the State was, during the constitutional drafting
period, the most controversial aspect of the new legal text, to the extent that it
almost ruined the whole transitional process. The fact that the territorial organiza-
tion and the Autonomous Regions are only foreseen in the Constitution, letting the
Parliament the insert word development of the system, is the obvious consequence
of the latter. Although this agreement during the drafting period managed to solve
the transition to democracy, many authors criticize the fact that the Spanish decen-
tralization is a never-ending process. See Juan J. Linz, De la crisis de un Estado
unitario al Estado de las Autonomias in LA ESPA&A DE LAS AUTONOMIAS, 527-672
(Instituto de Estudios de Administraci6n Local ed., 1985) (translated by author).
3 HURST.HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 279 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1996)(1990).
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regarded as a key factor in the dramatic descent-and practical disappear-
ance-of political violence in the Iberic Peninsula.4
The "Principle of Autonomy" is formally established in the pream-
ble of the Spanish constitution which openly recognizes that one of the
goals of the State is to "[p]rotect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the
exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and in-
stitutions."5 Article 2 provides:
The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the
Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of
all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-
government of the nationalities and regions of which it is
composed and the solidarity among them all. 6
By 1983, seventeen autonomy statutes covering the entire national
territory had already been adopted,7 and in subsequent years the autonomic
process reached higher degrees of decentralization with the negotiation and
approval of newer and more extensive autonomy arrangements.8 Through
these arrangements, the de facto cultural and linguistic plurality of Spain
finally found political and legal recognition. Because of this recognition,
the autonomous regions in Spain enjoy an extraordinarily wide set of com-
4 See generally Fernandez i Calvet, J., Terra Lliure 1979-1985, Coleccio La
Rella, Barcelona, (1986). "Terra Lliure, (meaning "Free Land" in Catalan) was a
leftist and Catalan nationalist separatist armed group. It was considered a terrorist
group by the Spanish government. It was formed in 1979 and disbanded in 1995.
Terra Lliure, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TerraLluire (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
See Juan Antonio Horrach, Vctimas de ETA y de la sociedad espaflola: Disec-
ciones, available at http://www.kiliedro.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task
=view&id=171. Euzkadi and Freedom in Basque is an armed Basque nationalist
separatist organization, founded in 1959. Although ETA still represents a major
threat in Spanish political stability, the organization's capability to attack has re-
duced substantially since the early 1980's. Between 1978-1980, ETA killed 239
victims. In the last three years, only three casualties are attributed to ETA.
5 Pmbl. C.E. (emphasis added).
6 Art. 2 C.E. (emphasis added).
7 The only exceptions of Spanish territories not enjoying an autonomous regime
are Ceuta and Melilla, "Autonomous Cities" with a lower degree of self-govern-
ment. See Eduardo. J. Ruiz Vieytez, Federalism, Subnational Constitutional Ar-
rangements, and the Protection of Minorities in Spain in FEDERALISM,
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY RIGHTS 133, 141-42 (G. Alan Tarr,
et al. eds., 2004).
8 The third generation of Autonomy Statutes began in 2006, with the adoption of
the third Statute for Catalonia.
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petences, including health and education, and they currently manage a
budget similar to the central govemment.9 In fact, the depth of Spanish
decentralization is comparable to, and in some cases even higher than,
many western European federal states, such as Germany or Belgium.' 0
However, a meticulous analysis of the structure of territorial power
and certain constitutional provisions makes clear that profound differences
exist between the Spanish "State of Autonomies" and a classical federal
State." In modem Spain, it is the central power that has the ability to create
sub-state entities, not the other way around as in the case of federations.12 It
is the state that is the original sovereign, and, as such, it retains a position of
superiority in its relations with the autonomous regions. This superiority is
apparent in the powers provided to the central authorities by Article 155 of
Spanish Constitution:
If a Self-governing Community does not fulfill the obliga-
tions imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or
acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general
interest of Spain, the Government, after having lodged a
complaint with the President of the Self-governing Com-
munity and failed to receive satisfaction therefore, may, fol-
lowing approval granted by the overall majority of the
Senate, take all measures necessary to compel the Commu-
nity to meet said obligations, or to protect the above-men-
tioned general interest.'3
Recent Spanish history has been characterized by strong, and even
bitter, disputes between the central government and certain regional autono-
9 The Autonomies spent 40% of the total public expenditure in 2002, the same
amount as the Central Government. See El Estado supera a la Seguridad Social en
gasto por el traspaso de la sanidad, CINcO DIAS, Sept. 26, 2004, http://www.
cincodias.com/articulo/economia/Estado/supera/Seguridad/Social/gasto/traspaso/
sanidad/cdseco/20020926cdscdieco_4/Tes/.
10 Jonathan House, Is Spain too localized? - Regional bodies' heft weights on
commerce, business groups say, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Aug. 2, 2007.
11 See Luis MORENO, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SPAIN, http://camlaw.
rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/moreno.pdf
12 See Art. 151.2.4. C.E. If the draft statute of Autonomy is approved in each
province by the majority of validly cast votes, it shall be referred to the Parliament.
Both Chambers, in plenary assembly, shall decide upon the text by means of a vote
of ratification. Once the statute has been approved, the King shall sanction it and
shall promulgate it as law.
13 Art. 155 C.E. (emphasis added).
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mies. 14 But no central Spanish government has ever even threatened to use
the powers established in Article 155, since even partial suppression of the
political autonomies is considered an excessively drastic political measure
with unknown social repercussions.' 5 Therefore, instead of authoritative ac-
tions, the Spanish political practice has been to use negotiations and judicial
remedies before the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, in recent years, Ar-
ticle 155 has returned to the pages of the most conservative and centralist
newspapers of the country. 16 There have been cases of ethno-Spaniards in
autonomous territories who were unable to access public education in Span-
ish for their children. This is due to a presumed "aggressive linguistic pol-
icy" in certain regions, especially in Catalonia. In the opinion of certain
political analysts, these occurrences justify the intervention of the state to
preserve both the equality of all the citizens of the state and the common
language of the "Spanish nation."' 17 Thus, the suppression of the autono-
mous regime would be a necessary measure to defend the state and the
majority population (regional minority in Catalonia) against the attacks of
an extremist "minority Catalan nationalism."' 18
Far from being an issue of strict internal-constitutional dimensions,
Spanish pluri-nationality, the process of political decentralization, potential
suppression of autonomous regions are a matter of international concern
since they are tightly intertwined with the concept of self-determination.
Consequently, this paper will explore the decisive limitations imposed by
14 See Carrillo, S., El Estado Autondmico y la Unidad de Espafia, OP-ED, EL
PALS, Nov. 24, 2003, at 11.
15 See Solozabal, J. J., Sobre el Estado Autoncmico Espafiol,78 REVISTA DE Es-
TUDIOS POLUTICOS (Nueva .poca) 105, 128 (1992), available at http://www.cepc.
es/rap/Publicaciones/Revistas/3/REPNE_078_105.pdf.
16 See SERVIMEDIA, Fraga afirma que habra que "colgar de alglin sitio " a los
nacionalistas, EL PAIS, Dec. 11, 2008, at 17. See also A. Puerta, Los Estatutos
Desbordan la Constitucidn, ABC, Dec. 7, 2008, at 17, available at http://www.
abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-07-12-2008/abc/Nacional/los-estatutos-desbordan-la-
constitucion_911747720849.html. See also, Angel Fernndez, Frenar el secesion-
ismo totalitario via art(culo 155, Mar. 5, 2008, available at http://independent.
typepad.com/elindependent/2008/03/frenar-el-seces.html. See also Articulo 155
Suspension de autonomia? RESURGIR, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://gazulin.
blogspot.com/2007/10/articulo-155-suspensin-autonoma.html. See also Art(culo
155 de la Constitucidn para defender la democracia espahola, IPETITIONS, June 30,
2008, available at http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/blogdelpaisvasco/. See also
Juan Carlos Girauta, Ha llegado la hora del 155, LIBERTAD DIGITAL, May 22,
2003, http://www.libertaddigital.com/index.php?action=desaopi&cpn= 13708.
17 See supra note 16.
18 Id.
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international law through the concept of self-determination upon the Span-
ish central government, in the hypothetical case of the exercise of the facul-
ties granted in Article 155 of the Spanish constitutional text. Part I analyzes
the concept of internal self-determination in relation to minorities in inde-
pendent states and its absolute identification with the idea of human rights
of minority groups. Part II focuses on the political dimension of minority
rights, the highly controversial international right to political autonomy and
its applicability, if any, to the Spanish case. Finally, Part III studies the
limitations on the recognition and exercise of minority rights and internal
self-determination of minorities in International Law and, therefore, ana-
lyzes the justifications for the suppression of Autonomous regimes.
PART I: MINORITIES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
"By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full
freedom, to determine, when and as they wish their internal
and external political status, without external interference,
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social
and cultural development."
Helsinki Final Act (1975), Principle VII1 9
Few norms in modern international law are more vigorously pro-
moted or widely accepted than the right of all peoples to self-determina-
tion.20 Proclaimed in countless international instruments,21 the International
Court of Justice has recognized it as an erga omnes22 right and as "one of
the essential principles of contemporary international law."'23 Paradoxically,
the legal right to self-determination is also one of the most intriguing and
enigmatic, notions of post-World War II international law.24 Unfortunately
19 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, Principle VIII,
Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
20 See HANNUM, supra note 3, at 27.
21 Inter alia, the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights or the Helsinki Declaration. For further details on international conventions
containing the principle of self-determination, see Patrick Thomberry, Self-Deter-
mination, Minorities and Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38
INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 867, 867(Oct. 1989).
22 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30).
23 Id.
24 ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL APPRAISAL 1
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)
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for the peaceful relations between nations in many parts of the world, the
originally political, and currently legal, principle of self-determination, with
its obvious emotional weight and tremendous "state-shattering" ef-
fect,25,remains as obscure and imprecise as when President Woodrow Wil-
son proclaimed it in the Palace of Versailles. 26
An in-depth analysis of the concept of self-determination is beyond
the scope of this paper, and a comprehensive theorization of this legal prin-
ciple is certainly beyond the capacities of this author. As a legal right,27 its
holders (the "peoples") and its scope are unclear, and endless efforts to
configure a definition have not produced a minimum consensus or any con-
crete result. Most of the time, the researcher of topics related to self-deter-
mination sadly observes that he is assisting political debates in which the
legal arguments are scarce or simply non-existent. 28 This section of the arti-
cle will attempt to limit itself to the legal aspects of the notion of self-
determination essential to the issue addressed. The subsequent sections re-
garding right to autonomy and its limitations will widely depend on the
basis established herein.
The word "self-determination" alludes, purely in abstract, to free-
dom of choice and to free will. In the early stages of the legal configuration
of the principle, the Committee which initially discussed self-determination
during the draft of the U.N. Charter clearly indicated that "an essential ele-
ment [of the principle was a] free and genuine expression of the will of the
people. '29 A necessary consequence of the latter is the close connection
between the inherent nature of self-determination and the democratic princi-
ple.30 Thus, the right to self-determination is probably "best viewed as enti-
25 "The concept of self-determination is both radical, progressive, alluring and, at
the same time, subversive and threatening." Id. at 5.
26 See HANNUM, supra note 3, at 27.
27 Originally considered a political principle, the inclusion of self-determination in
important international instruments and General Assembly Resolutions with a clear
'legal" wording has turned the principle in a legal right. See THOMAS D. Mus-
GRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITrES 62 (Clarendon Press 1997).
28 See CASSESE, supra note 24, at 2.
29 Report of Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I (June 13, 1945), in 6
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization 446,
455 (1945).
30 The internal aspects of self-determination form, according to an increasing
number of authors, the centre around which norms about respect for pluralism or
the right of popular participation are beginning to take shape in international law.
See Thomas. M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J.LNT'L L. 46, 54 (1992).
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MINORITIES
tling a people to choose its political allegiance to influence the political
order under which it lives" and to preserve its identity.3
The "external" dimension of the right to self-determination, being
the right of a people to determine its status without external interference
and including the option of independence, is the most controversial, "slo-
gan-like quality" and "potentially explosive"32 aspect of the concept be-
cause of its apparent tension with the right to territorial integrity of states
is.3 3 Originally conceived in contemporary international law as the legal
basis to assist, in particular, with the course of third world liberation against
imperialism and colonialism, 34 the early developments of the new legal
principle by the U.N. General Assembly linked the concept of self-determi-
nation to that of decolonization. 35 However, the notion of self-determination
survived the era of decolonization, and has become a powerful ideological
weapon in the hands of postmodern tribalism movements. 36 Since the con-
notations of external self-determination are an obvious incentive for ethnic
or national claims to secession, the international community, reluctant to
accept the divisive forces that encourage state disintegration or the forma-
tion of myriad new political units, 37 soon made clear that the term "people,"
the ultimate repository of the right, could not be considered on ethnic, ra-
31 See MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER 47 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 1992).
32 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 444, 13 (Nov. 1952), 29 (United Kingdom).
33 See SIMON CHESTERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 417 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
34 Christian Tomuschat, Self-determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 1 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
35 See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Session U.N. Doc. A/4684
(Dec. 14, 1960).
36 The "postmodern tribalism" is the well-known concept used by Thomas Franck
in reference to the political and historically-determinist national movements that
search the constitution of unicultural States through the breakup of existing mul-
ticultural States. See T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Seces-
sion, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 4 (Catherine Brohman
et al. eds., 1993).
37 "Does self-determination mean the right to secession? Does self-determination
constitute a right of fragmentation or a justification for the fragmentation of States?
Does self-determination mean the right of a people to sever association with an-
other power regardless of the economic effect upon both parties, regardless of the
effect upon their internal stability and their external security, regardless of the ef-
fect upon their neighbors or the international community? Obviously not." Eleanor
Roosevelt, Department of State Bulletin 917, 919 (1952).
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cial, cultural or linguistic basis. 38 Thus, in modem international law, the
right to self-determination without external interference is granted to the
whole population within the boundaries of pre-existing non self-governing
territories or independent States, 39 thereby excluding the separate ethnic or
religious groups, whether dominant or not, in those territories.40 Unfortu-
nately for the advocates of the idea of "one nation one State," which is
potentially implied in the notion of self-determination, the stability of the
principles of uti possidetis and territorial integrity of states are granted pri-
ority when they conflict with the "secessionist" face of self-determination
in contemporary international law.4 1 As a consequence, and in principle,
minority groups within pre-existing states, such as the Catalans or Basques
in Spain, do not have a legal entitlement to external self-determination. 42
However preponderant the principle of territorial integrity of states
may seem at first sight, it is certainly not absolute. Resolution 2625 (XXV)
of the General Assembly of the U.N., 43 adopted by consensus, represents a
38 See HANNUM, supra note 3, at 36.
39 "When the word peoples is used in this context ... it refers to the demos, not
the ethnos." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the
Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems involving Minorities, 76, U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993 34, (Aug. 10, 1993) (prepared by Asbj0m Eide) [herein-
after Eide Report].
40 "The express acceptance in [relevant U.N. resolutions] of the principles of na-
tional unity and the territorial integrity of the State implies non-recognition of the
right of secession... The right to secession from an existing State member of the
United Nations does not exist as such in the instruments or in the practice followed
by the Organization, since to seek to invoke it in order to disrupt the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a State would be a misapplication of the principle of
self-determination contrary to the purposes of the United Nations Charter." U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of United Na-
tions Resolutions, 90. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (prepared by
G. Espiell Special Rapporteur).
41 See Franck, supra note 36, at 8.
42 "[I]f every ethnic, religious, or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would
be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all
would become even more difficult to achieve." An Agenda for Peace, 17, U.N.
Doc. A/47/277, (June 17, 1992) (prepared by B. Boutross-Ghali).
43 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions G.A.Res. 4355, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Dec. 17,
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revolutionary step in the configuration of the right to self-determination."
By merging the principles of internal and external self-determination, and
including the notions of representative government, human rights and non-
discrimination in the core of the principle, it implicitly opens the gate to
secession for strongly unrepresented or oppressed minorities in their
States.45 This results from Paragraph 7 of the Resolution:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dis-
member or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour.4 6
The absolutely revolutionary aspect of Resolution 2625 (XXV) is that it
makes the territorial integrity of the state contingent upon the existence of a
government representing the whole people; one that is respectful of human
rights and the principle of non-discrimination. In the absence of such gov-
ernments, secession is permitted for the excluded and oppressed population.
Thus, these provisions constitute a strong argument to defend the emer-
gence in international law of a "democratic principle" 47 and an "oppression-
based" 48 approach to the concept of self-determination, which would prevail
1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States].
44 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 27, at 76.
45 Id. at 77.
46 See Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, supra
note 43, at I 7(emphasis added).
47 "There are grounds for holding the view that a customary rule of internal self-
determination as a right of the whole population of a Sovereign State is currently
taking shape in the International Community [according to which] the whole people
of every State would have the right freely to choose its rulers, through a democratic
and pluralistic process and in particular by means of free and genuine elections."
CASSESE, supra note 24, at 311, 346. See Franck, supra note 30, at 90-91.
48 "International Law recognizes a continuum of remedies ranging from protection
of individual rights to minority rights, and ending with secession as the ultimate
remedy." LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
1, 222 (Yale Univ. Press, 1978).
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over the idea of territorial integrity. Subsequent state practice seems to con-
firm this "emancipating" and "liberating" meaning of self-determination. 49
International law makes a clear distinction between the term "peo-
ple" and "minority." 50 But since the former is the only subject entitled to
self-determination (a question that this paper will not dispute), the internal,
democratic and pro-human rights dimension of the right to self-determina-
tion has a decisive influence on the protection of minority groups. 1 The
fact that minorities are not entitled to self-determination does not mean that
these groups fall completely out of the scope of the norm since minorities,
as an especially vulnerable part of the "people," are indirectly protected by
the international principle of self-determination through the specific obliga-
tions that these norms impose upon governments of independent states.
Thus, in this configuration of internal self-determination, the test for deter-
mining the reasonableness of external self-determination has progressively
become "the nature and extent of the deprivation of human rights of the
subgroup claiming the right. '5 2 Therefore, the international human rights
regime, and especially the human rights of minority groups, necessarily ac-
quires a vital importance in the configuration of the scope and extent of the
right to self-determination. As stated by Alfred Cobban:
One State is not to be condemned for its diversity of lan-
guage, religion, or descent, nor another for it homogeneity.
The State is only to be condemned, and secession ap-
proved, where it does not protect and promote, in reasona-
ble measure, the rights of the individual citizens, included
49 The secessionist processes that lead to the independence of Bangladesh from
Pakistan and the new ex-Yugoslavian republics are clear examples of how the In-
ternational community has considered the oppression and the massive Human
Rights violations as clear cases of abuse of sovereignty, and therefore, has accepted
the secession of minority groups from highly repressive States.
50 See, e.g.,, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Art. 27 (Fiftieth
Session, 1994), Rights of Minorities, U.N. Doc. CCPR /C/21/Rev.1/Add.5at 3.1
(1994) [hereinafter General Comment 23].
51 See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORI-
TIES 14 (1991).
52 See Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth
of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 193, 204 (Yonah Alexander & Robert. A. Friedlander eds.,
Westview Press 1980).
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among which are their interests as members of a national
community.53
One last consideration should be made in our approach to the com-
plex notion of self-determination. Although it has been argued that minority
rights necessarily determine the scope of self-determination, 54 the exercise
of these rights and possible access to political autonomy will be treated as
the exercise by minorities of a right to "internal self-determination." It is
necessary to distinguish both notions, since they are independent and have
different right holders, and their infringement results in different interna-
tional consequences. Minority rights, in purity, are not a "soft" version of
external self-determination for ethnic groups that do not reach the status of
"peoples," but, strictly in the context of the latter, a necessary obligation
upon the state in order to prevent the emergence of a right to secession as a
consequence of the democratic and pluralist dimension of internal self-
determination.
From the preceding analysis, a couple of important legal conse-
quences must be pointed out which are relevant for any study of the impact
of the right of self-determination of governmental measures which, like
those under Article 155 of Spanish Constitution, negatively affect the au-
tonomous regimes of minorities. In the first place, those who argue, as do
many journalists in Spain,55 that the suppression of Autonomic regimes
under article 155 is an internal matter with no international restrictions as
minorities do not enjoy a right to self-determination, are missing essential
developments in the contemporary configuration of the right to self-deter-
mination. 56 Secondly, the key element to consider in the international legal-
ity of measures under article 155 is their consistency with the scope of
53 ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
140 (Thomas Y. Crowell, ed., Collins Clear-Type Press 1969) (1945)(emphasis
added).
54 The right to self-determination has been defined as "the right of individuals
within a State to preserve their ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics" (empha-
sis added). U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.450, 20 November 1952, 43 (Israel). However,
international law clearly limits the right to self-determination to the "peoples."
55 See generally supra note 16.
56 The experts participating in the Meeting on National Minorities convened in
Geneva in July 1991 in the framework of the CSCE clearly established that
"[ilssues concerning national minorities ... are matters of legitimate international
concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the
respective State" (citing RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 13 (U.S. Inst. of Peace Press ed., 1996)).
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rights of minority groups as defined and delimited by international human
rights law.
PART II: AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO
POLITICAL AUTONOMY?
"Autonomy is for the minority like water for a fish"
Dr. Csaba Tabajdi
The emerging notion of democratic governance under the right to
internal self-determination ensures that the rights guaranteed under human
rights law are properly observed without distinction as to race, ethnicity,
religion or linguistic bias. 57 Although the international community has de-
finitively rejected any link between ethnicity and the legal subject entitled
to the right to self-determination, international law has not ignored the legit-
imacy and importance of protecting ethnic minorities under the umbrella of
self-determination. The general acceptance of a common obligation under
the right to self-determination to protect minorities' rights to collective ex-
istence and self-expression is the response of international law to deeply felt
needs for group identity and dignity. In this context, the minority rights
regime under human rights law, since it aims to (1) ensure equality and
non-discrimination while (2) protecting the racial, linguistic, religious or
cultural characteristics which distinguish a minority group from the major-
ity, will play an essentially restrictive role for every state willing to preserve
its territorial integrity.
In Spain, the Basque and Catalan communities enjoy the interna-
tional status of minorities,5 8 and, therefore, the central government is
obliged to scrupulously respect their internationally recognized rights as
such. But would a suppression of autonomy infringe the collective rights of
these communities? Or, rephrasing the question, does an international right
57 GNANAPALA WELHENGAMA, MINORITIES' CLAIMS: FROM AUTONOMY TO SE-
CESSION "INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE PRACTICE" 127 (Ashgate 2000).
58 Whether or not a minority exists is a question of fact and does not depend on a
formal determination by the State. See General Comment 23, supra note 50, 5.2.
As Catalan and Basque communities are de facto "groups of persons resident
within a sovereign State which constitutes less than a half the population of the
national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic,
religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of the popula-
tion[,]" they are directly entitled to minority rights. Eide Report, supra note 39, at T
29. The fact that Spain recognizes "the gypsies" as the "only ethnic minority ex-
isting in Spain" is irrelevant for the qualification of Basques and Catalans as minor-
ities. See Spain, CCPR/C/58/Add.1, n 191, 196-97.
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to political autonomy through the minorities' rights framework exist under
the principle of self-determination?
It is undisputed that autonomy embodies the essence of the concept
of self-determination, 59 "but what is less clear is whether autonomy is an
established component of the right to self-determination.160 In the first
place, it is commonly argued that international conventions or other U.N.
documents do not provide for any general right of autonomy to regions or
regional minorities. 61 Those mentions of autonomy that can be found in
international instruments, such as the Copenhagen Document of the Human
Dimension (1990), are fairly modest, and their phrasings clearly do not es-
tablish an obligation upon the State to establish autonomy. 62 In addition,
fearing that autonomous regimes would lead to minorities' secessionist
claims and would result in the State dismemberment, many members of the
international community have held an utterly hostile attitude towards auton-
omous rights for minorities. 63 Historical cases of the abolition of constitu-
tionally or internationally guaranteed autonomous regimes without
international condemnation, such as the north and east provinces of Sri
Lanka or the Crimean autonomy in Ukraine, also suggests that state practice
has not recognized any international right to political autonomy for minor-
ity groups. Given the absence of express language in international conven-
tional law, and the hostile attitude of many states, a considerable section of
the academic community denies the idea of autonomy within an indepen-
59 Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the UN Commission on
Human Rights: A Case of the Immovable Object and the Irresistible Force, 18 (4)
HUM. RTS. Q. 782, 797 (1996) (citing Nicaragua's statement).
60 See WELHENGAMA, supra note 58, at 125.
61 Lauri Hannikainen, Self-determination and Autonomy in International Law, in
AUTONOMY: APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 79, 84 (Markku Suski ed., Kluwer
Law International 1998).
62 See LAPIDOTH, supra note 56, at 13.
63 "We must prevent the minority from transforming itself into a privileged caste
and taking definite form as a foreign group instead of becoming fused in the society
in which it lives. If we carry the exaggerated conception of the autonomy of minor-
ities to the last extreme, those minorities will become disruptive elements in the
State and a source of national disorganization." J. Blociszewski, Revenue des Sci-
ences Politiques, in BARON HEYKING, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINOR-
ITIES: THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 31, 44 (Grotius Society
1928).
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dent state as a part of self-determination for the purposes of international
law.64
Arguments supporting the non-existence of an international right to
political autonomy are, thus, far from weak. But strong and convincing ar-
guments based on the wording of essential international instruments and on
recent state practice suggest that the autonomous regimes in Catalonia and
the Basque country are under the legal protection of the principle of self-
determination and the rights of minorities. To begin with, the open-texture
of the positive obligations imposed upon the states by the instruments grant-
ing minority rights constitute solid grounds to assert the existence of such a
right to autonomy for particular cases. The General Assembly Resolution
47/135, entitled Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 65 states in Article 4 that
"[s]tates shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belong-
ing to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights
and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality
before the law" and "shall take measures to create favourable conditions to
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and
to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs. '66 Au-
tonomy, as a model designed to appease a minority group in a designated
region of the state, provides the minority with the best means to influence
their own political order to control all issues that matter most in their daily
64 "There is undoubtedly no right to autonomy at the level of general international
law. Autonomy is thus not a specific human right, formulated as such." Marku
Suksi, On the Entrenchment of Autonomy, in AUTONOMY: APPLICATIONS AND IM-
PLICATIONsi50, 151(Marku Suski ed., Kluwer Law International 1998).
See also WELHENGAMA, supra note 58, at 133: "Autonomy does not have a strong
basis in international law. Internal domestic arrangements such as autonomies fall
within the sphere of constitutional law, which are normally beyond the control of
general international law." Id.
65 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Relig-
ious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/
135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Minorities].
On its behalf, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
drawn up by the Council of Europe, obliges the signatory States to "create the
conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national
minorities in social, cultural and economic life and public affairs, in particular
those affecting them." Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities art. 15, Feb. 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 351, 356.
66 Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 66, at art. 4 (emphasis
added)
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lives, thus preserving their cultural, ethnic, and historical identity.67 Since
the minorities find themselves in an especially vulnerable position due to
their different characteristics, the rule "'one person, one vote' may not be
sufficient to ensure the effective participation in the political and cultural
life of the state required under international human rights norms. '68 One
practical example is the absolutely essential role that the autonomous au-
thorities of Catalonia and the Basque country play in the protection of their
minority language through the decentralized educational system. 69 In those
cases, autonomy becomes a practical necessity for the enjoyment of minor-
ity human rights, and therefore sets itself up as an international obligation
upon the state. 70 Autonomy is not only "the best guarantee a minority could
wish for, 71 but, in certain cases, a necessary guarantee that a minority can
ask for and to which the state is internationally obliged to comply. 72
Further arguments based on state practice support the binding char-
acter of a presumed right to autonomy. Decentralization of power and au-
tonomy at a regional level have increasingly become popular in the last two
decades and are being used in national and international affairs in particular
as a solution to ethnic conflicts.73 According to certain authors, the frequent
occurrence of autonomy, and its link with the international peace and secur-
ity, would have turned the minority right to political autonomy into a norm
of customary international law. 74 Included in the Lord Carrington's Euro-
67 See Eide Report, supra note 39, at 88. See also Patrick Thomberry, TheUN
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis and Observations, in THE UN Mi-
NORITY RIGHTS DECLARATION 42, 43 (A. Phillips and A. Rosas eds., 1993).
68 See HANNUM, supra note 3, at 471.
69 See Ley Orgdnica 6/2006, "Estatuto de Autonomfa de Catalufia" (Catalan Au-
tonomous Statute), Article 131, (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.gencat.cat/
generalitat/cas/estatut/preambul.htm. See also Ley Orgdnica 3/1979, "Estatuto de
Autonomfa del Pafs Vasco" (Basque Country Autonomous Statute) Article 16
(Dec. 18, 1979), available at http://www.lehendakariordetza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r
472613/es/contenidos/informacion/estatuto-guernica/es_455/adjuntos/estatu-c.pdf
70 See G. Alfredsson, Report on Equality and Non-discrimination: Minority
Rights, presented at the 7th Colloquy on the European Convention on Human
Rights in Copenhagen, Oslo, and Lund (May 30 - June 2, 1990).
71 Id.
72 If this is the only means of preserving the existence of a particular group. See
Hurst Hannum et al., The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 858 (1980).
73 See WELHENGAMA, supra note 58, at 127.
74 See, e.g., D. Sanders, Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law? 55 NORD.
J. INT'L LAW 17, 17 (1986). Special Rapporteur Eide is more cautious, since in his
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pean Community formula for the recognition of the independence of state
members of the Yugoslav Federation (European Community's Peace Con-
ference at the Hague, October 4, 1991) is the requirement of "[a]dequate
arrangements ... for the protection of minorities, including human rights
guarantees and possibly special status for certain areas.' 75 On the basis of
state practice, this supports the notion of an international right to autonomy.
Another case of secession in which the abolition of the autonomous regime
played a key role is the recent-and unexpectedly wide-recognition by
many States of the international community of the independence of Kosovo,
which could also be considered an evidence of this emerging rule of cus-
tomary international law. The broad number of cases in which autonomy
has proved a successful solution to ethnic conflicts, such as in Spain, and
the practically unanimous support of the legal community of decentraliza-
tion as the best formula to respect ethnic identity while preserving the invi-
olability of territorial integrity of States, 76 can contribute substantially to the
legitimacy of the norm. Therefore, in return, this norm gains ever-increas-
ing validity in the arena of international law.
Finally, the existence of a right to autonomy of the Basque and
Catalan communities in Spain finds support in the idea, conveyed by a sec-
tor of the academia, of the "international legalization" of implemented au-
tonomous regimes. Thus, autonomy arrangements created within a state by
means of constitutional or ordinary legislation may, "at least to the extent
that the beneficiary of the arrangement can be defined as a people," be
understood to be protected under the international principle of self-determi-
report to the ECOSOC he recognized his doubts about the claim that there already
existed a general right to political autonomy. However, he admitted the possibility
that autonomy could evolve as a general right through international instruments
such as the UN Declaration on Minorities and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. See Eide Report, supra note 39, at 88.
75 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Security
Council Resolution 713 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/23169, at 20 (Annex II).
76 In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly in 1991, Prince Hans Adam II of
Liechtenstein announced his intention to pursue a new direction for self-determina-
tion. The vision was to create a new legal framework with the goal of granting local
communities greater self-administration. He hoped to make self-determination less
of a zero-sum proposition with respect to national borders. Some see the merit of
the proposal in its potential to underscore symbolic rights while restricting the po-
tential for destabilizing the international system. See Richard Falk, Self-Determina-
tion Under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence
of Experience, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION,
AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2002).
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nation.77 In this context, the express recognition in the Spanish constitu-
tional text of the existence of Peoples78 and nationalities 79 within the state
may be particularly relevant. In addition, the mention in Disposicion Adi-
cional Primera and Disposici6n Transitoria Segunda of the "historical
rights" and constitutional privileges while accessing autonomy of those ter-
ritories who achieved autonomy in the past (the cases of Catalonia, the
Basque Country and Galicia during the Spanish Second Republic between
1933 and 1936) may indicate some acquired rights to which international
law and the right to self-determination are not indifferent.80
Overall, the acknowledgment of the existence of a general right by
minority groups to a certain level of self-government or autonomy within
the state on the basis of the right to self-determination is doubtful or, at
least, controversial. Yet, a solid legal basis exists for the assertion that in
certain cases states may be internationally obliged to grant some degree of
political autonomy to minority groups. Subsequently, Basque and Catalan
nationalist advocates should not encounter serious difficulties to qualify
their autonomous regimes as mandatory under the principle of self-determi-
nation. However, that does not mean that every measure suppressing the
political autonomy of these communities under Article 155 of Spanish Con-
stitution is illegal according to principle of self-determination. International
law establishes express limitations on the exercise of minority rights and
autonomy, amongst which the loyalty to the central government and the
respect of the "minority rights" of the majority population within the region
are essential elements. Being that the State is the supreme authority and is
ultimately responsible internationally for human rights violations that occur
within its borders, systematic violations by the minority group of the inter-
national limitations on the exercise of autonomous authority could justify
the abolition of the autonomous regime. What are these limitations and
what is their content?
17 See Suksi, supra note 65, at 162.
78 Pmbl., C.E.
79 Art. 2, C.E.
80 "There may be some acquired rights, such as pre-existing autonomy within
union republics of dissolved federal States, that should not be done away with." See
Eide Report, supra note 39, at 88.
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PART III: LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY AND
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABOLISHING THE
AUTONOMOUS REGIME
"International Human Rights Law is concerned, above all
with the equality and dignity of every human being. It,
therefore, sets limits to the collective rights of both majori-
ties and minorities, none of which can be used to overrule
the freedom and equal dignity of the human being. "8 1
Asbjorn Eide
So far, this paper has addressed the essential role that minority
rights play in relation to the state, as well as the correlative benefits for the
population as a whole and minorities in particular, under the notion of inter-
nal self-determination. However, the relationship between rights of minor-
ity groups and self-determination, "two sides of the same coin, '82 is not
limited to this particular "face" of the principle of self-determination. Mi-
nority rights is a constant element surrounding the right to self-determina-
tion, and it affects all its possible dimensions. 83 Whenever a community
(peoples or minority) accedes to independence (external self-determination)
or autonomy (internal self-determination), the resulting political unit (state
or autonomy) will never be matched by national unity or ethnic homogene-
ity. 84 Through secession or autonomy, a minority becomes the majority of
the new political reality but, unavoidably, the process creates other "new"
minorities. Therefore, as Kunz points out, the protection of minority groups
is the "strict and logical corollary" of self-determination 85 and an ineludible
requirement, both for peoples and minorities, for its full or indirect exercise.
No scholar could dispute that the protection of minority rights, with
the inviolability of pre-existing frontiers, has become the absolute principle
in international law regarding the access to independence. Undeniable evi-
dence of this is the requirement of "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and
national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments sub-
scribed to in the framework of the CSCE" as a necessary precondition to
formal recognition in the European Community's Guidelines on the Recog-
81 Eide Report, supra note 39, 89.
82 Thomberry, supra note 21, at 867.
83 "A close relationship exists between SD and minorities, and historical anteced-
ents reveal in a majority of cases that when SD is in issue, the status or rights of
minority groups will also be an issue." Musgrave, supra note 27, at 1.
84 See Thomberry, supra note 51, at 12 and citations therein.
85 Josef. L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, The Present Status of the International Law
for the Protection of Minorities 48 AM. J. INT'L L., 103, 282 (1954).
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nition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.86 The
United States adopted the same position by declaring that its policy regard-
ing the political changes that occurred in the Soviet Union would be gov-
erned, inter alia, by the "safeguarding of human rights," which included
"equal treatment of minorities." 87 The Badinter Commission, on its behalf,
confirmed the position of Europe and North America by stating in its Opin-
ion No. 1 that "respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the
rights of peoples and minorities" are "binding on all parties to the succes-
sion" as peremptory norms of customary international law. 88
The underlying idea behind the protection of minority rights as a
condition for external self-determination is none other than plurality, demo-
cratic governance and human rights, in connection with peace and security,
as legitimizing elements of the exercise of political power.89 The same no-
tion, as explained in Part I of this paper, hides beneath the protection of
minorities under the principle of internal self-determination. The limitations
imposed by international law on the exercise of minority rights and, there-
fore, on the right to autonomy could be considered evidence of the same
emerging-and increasingly legal-principle in contemporary international
law. The whole phenomenon of self-determination, as it presumes the ac-
cess or exercise of political power, is inherently linked to the protection and
promotion of human and minority rights. This principle does not only affect
state power but absolutely all levels in which any kind of political power is
exercised.
The international limitations on minority rights and the right to au-
tonomy are based both in conventional provisions and state practice. Article
8 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Minorities states that the rights
contained in the declaration shall not prejudice, inter alia, "the enjoyment
by all persons of universally recognized human rights and fundamental
freedoms." 90 In the context of territorial autonomy, these "universally rec-
ognized human rights" include the minority rights of the "regional minor-
86 Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Eu-
rope and in the Soviet Union, Dec. 19, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1486, 1486-87 (1992).
87 James A. Baker, III,U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Approach to Changes in the So-
viet Union, News Conference in Washington, DC (Sept. 4, 1991), in 2 U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC HEALTH DISPATCH 667 (1991).
88 Conference on Yugoslavia: Arbitration Committee Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M.
1494, 1496 (1992).
89 See Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determina-
tion, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 1 (Christian Tomuschat ed.,
1993). See CASSESE, supra note 24, at 302-12.
90 See Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 68, at art. 8.
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ity."91 The latter is confirmed by the position of the international
community during the process establishing self-determination for Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the early 1990's. A key document is the Vance-Owen pro-
posal of October 20, 1992 which not only provides an autonomic develop-
ment plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also contains detailed provisions
regarding the autonomous regimes, with a special emphasis on human and
minority rights.92 The Dayton Accords, concluding with mediation by the
United States in which two entities were configured in the nature of auton-
omy or federalism for the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, human and minor-
ity rights were also prominent.93 During the first challenge regarding self-
determination that the international community faced after the decoloniza-
tion era, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, minority rights were not
considered a condition only in cases for external and full self-determination,
but also an obligation upon sub-state structures of power.
The protection of minorities within independent states must never
destroy the basic principles of equality and non-discrimination. Pluralism,
democracy and human rights are the base of modern political power and,
therefore, its essential limits. All the obligations imposed upon the state
under the concept of internal self-determination and to the peoples under
external self-determination are, mutatis mutandis, duties upon the autono-
mous regimes of minority groups. 94 The legal consequences of infringing
these limitations are, however, radically different for the different groups
involved in processes of self-determination. While the peoples will not be
recognized as independent states by the international community, and the
states will see their territorial integrity legitimately threatened, minority
groups may be doomed to lose their political autonomy. This radical conse-
91 The Meeting of the Experts on National Minorities convened in Geneva in July
1991 in the framework of the CSCE. They concluded that "[i]n areas inhabited
mainly by persons belonging to a national minority" the human rights of all persons
had to be protected, including those of members of the group that is the majority in
the whole State. See LAPIDOTH, supra note 56, at 13 (emphasis added).
92 Proposed constitutional structure for Bosnia-Herzegovina, submitted in the
framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in which the
United Nations, the European Community, the CSCE and other organizations par-
ticipated. See Report of the Secretary General on the International Conference on
the Former Annex VII 31 I.L.M. 1584, 1584-1594 (1992).
93 See LAPIDOTH, supra note 56, at 15.
94 See also Eide Report, supra note 39, at 253. "Decentralization must therefore
be coupled with genuine pluralistic democratic governance in each territorial unit,
with the same respect for human rights and minorities as at the national level."
(emphasis added).
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quence derives from two basic principles in international law: the sover-
eignty of States and the international responsibility of states for breaches of
international law obligations. International human rights law, in which the
principles of equality and non-discrimination are cornerstones, constitutes a
comprehensive set of international obligations to be fulfilled by the State.95
The State is the ultimate internationally responsible subject, and
cannot escape from these obligations by transferring au-
thority to larger or smaller groups in society, by territorial
or personal arrangements for autonomy, unless sufficient
authority is preserved for the national government to en-
sure that all human rights are implemented on a basis of
equality throughout the territory of the State.96
Therefore, in cases of apparent violations of human rights, including the
rights of the "regional minority," by the Autonomies, the state is not just
entitled by their quality of sovereign holding the highest authority, but in-
ternationally obliged to abolish the autonomy arrangements.
From the preceding analysis, we can conclude that, by exercising
the faculties under Article 155 of Spanish Constitution, the Spanish central
government is playing a dangerous game. The suppression of an autono-
mous regime is a measure that must be necessarily justified by human rights
violations of the autonomous regimes, and that under international law
moves riskily between an obligation and a prohibition. The ultimate legiti-
mizing element in the adoption of this last-resort measure will be the rea-
sonableness in the consideration of the human rights granted by the
abolition in relation with the violation of minority human rights that the
95 "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant" International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), p. 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, Article 2. "The
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." Council of Europe, Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Article 1; "The States Parties to this Convention
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or
any other social condition." American Convention on Human Rights, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 July 1978, Article 1.1.
96 See Eide Report, supra note 39, at 91.
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measure implies. In the current circumstances, considering that the pre-
sumed violation of the rights of the ethno-Spanish minority in Catalonia are
based on absolutely sporadic cases (usually in rural areas) of inability to
exercise the right to study in the common language of Spanish-Castillian,
any measure under Article 155 would be utterly disproportionate and, thus,
would conflict with the principle of internal self-determination. A different
conclusion would be reached if the Catalan or Basque governments initiated
an aggressive campaign prohibiting the use of Spanish in regional schools
or institutions in an attempt to directly attack the Spanish culture in their
territories. The grey area between these two extremes, regardless of the
frustration that such a statement produces in a civil-law scholar, is unavoid-
ably condemned to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSIONS
Far from leading to a decline in ethnic and regional nationalism,
communications, modern technology and global economic interdependence
have heightened national groups' consciousness of their own particular
identity.97, Ethnic nationalists often claim to have a right to self-determina-
tion on the basis that they are "peoples", potentially threatening the interna-
tional stability and the territorial integrity of states. 98 The international
community, acknowledging that ignoring and maltreating ethnic minorities
is a primary cause of internal and international strife,99 has overcome its
traditional indolence in the "minority issue", promoting the universal value
of minority rights in a complex, but possible, reconciliation with territorial
integrity. Democratic governance, pluralism, effective political participa-
tion, protection and promotion of minorities' culture, language and religion,
and possibly a right to political autonomy have emerged in recent years as
indissoluble elements of a modern, post-colonial concept of internal self-
determination. In the dawn of the XXI century, responsiveness to legitimate
minority grievances has become the "hallmark of a government that re-
spects the human rights of its entire population, as well as the principle of
self-determination."' 100 In response to this growing willingness by states to
accommodate legitimate minority concerns, members of ethnic minorities
have become less militant and are increasingly engaging in constructive di-
alogue with state authorities. 01.
97 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 27, at 102.
98 See WELHENGAMA, supra note 58, at 206-207.
99 See Thomberry, supra note 21, at 889.
100 HANNUM, supra note 3, at 469.
101 See Eide Report, supra note 39, at 9.
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Recognition of minority rights and political empowerment of na-
tional groups within the States cannot, however, translate into the creation
of aggressive or oppressive regimes that exclude or attack the majority pop-
ulation or culture of the state, nor encourage overambitious separatist
claims. The key element of success in decentralization processes may be
found, as in the Spanish case, in a gradual transfer of authority to territorial
units who want it, while an over-all authority is retained by the central gov-
ernment. 10 2 As the last guarantor of equality and non-discrimination within
its whole territory, the state has the right, and the duty, to take any neces-
sary and proportional measures, including the last-resort abolition of auton-
omy, to protect the human rights of its entire population. This legally
binding principle of proportionality is not only a restraint upon central gov-
ernments and constitutional provisions while dealing with autonomous re-
gimes. It is also a legal symptom of a wider and increasingly "binding"
trend in international law: the trend towards representative governments and
respect of universally recognized human rights as the ultimate parameter of
legitimate political power.
102 Id. at [ 228.
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